ABSTRACT With the development of electronic commerce, the online auction has been used as another basic sales channel in addition to the traditional list price. How to balance two channels to maximize the total expected profit under limited supply has drawn wide attention from both researchers and sellers. Faced with this issue, this paper proposes an equilibrium management model for dual-channel sales of the service products aiming to optimize the list price and the best setting of the auction scheme. First, we analyze the symmetric equilibrium participation strategy of rational consumers facing two channels. We model the consumer choice of channels through a threshold type function based on the consumer's utility represented by a power exponential function, and then prove the unique existence of an auction-participation symmetric equilibrium, and demonstrate its monotone property in the customer's valuation. Based on the strategy of consumers, from the perspective of sellers, an equilibrium management model is built to obtain the optimal choice of the auction quantity, auction duration, and the posted price. Finally, an airline example is used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed model. This work enables the seller to segment the market appropriately so that two channels reinforce each other and cannibalization is mitigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Along with the rise of electronic commerce, the online auction has rapidly emerged as an alternative sales channel. Such dual-channel booking mechanisms are widely used in the airline, hotel and car rental industry. For example, airlines sell tickets through agents and online channel (like booking.com). China Southern Airlines and other airlines have dual or even more sales channels. This has an important influence on customer purchasing behaviours and pushes sellers of services to consider the dual-channel model. These trends raise some new important theoretical and practical questions. On the one hand, the auction can attract customers who are willing to pay at a price lower than the list price and increase the sales volume to earn extra revenue. On the other hand, the auction can probably allow customers who are willing to pay at a price higher than the list price to purchase products at a price lower than their expectation, which could eventually decrease revenue. In the 1990s, after Levis launched his own online store, he was collectively opposed by his co-retailers and eventually had to abandon the online site [1] . After Levis, manufacturers were cautious about online direct selling, for which they were fearful of channel conflicts. No enterprise wants to provide a business model of internal mutual deprivation and channel conflict. The research shows that whether there is product competition or not, reasonable pricing will effectively reduce channel conflicts, enrich the capability portfolio of the manufacturer and increase their market share, thereby generating more profit [2] , [3] . Thus, how to reasonably divide markets to achieve complementation between the two sales channels is the focus of this work.
Under a dual-channel mechanism, the seller will first need to announce the posted price, the initial capacity, the auction period and the reservation price about his products. The arrival of customers with single product demand can be assumed to obey a Poisson's distribution. They have independent and private value for the product and must decide whether to bid and wait for the auction outcome or to immediately purchase products at a fixed posted price. In the dual-channel sales mode, if enterprises set a high posted price, the posted price channel will be narrowed down.
Customers with a medium-high private value about the product will participate in the auction. Consequently, products are sold out at a lower price. On the other hand, if enterprises set a low posted price, the posted price channels can be expanded, and customers with a high assessed value of the product value can buy products at a low posted price, which will inevitably reduce the revenue of enterprises. Therefore, in order to maximize the revenue, two sales channels should be dealt with synchronously to decide both the posted price of products and the setting of the online auction.
Pricing has always been the focus of sellers in dualchannel. When a dual-channel supply is adopted, the pricing problem becomes more complex. It is affected by many factors [4] . First of all, pricing under dual channels is influenced by customers' reservation valuation. Secondly, the pricing of dual channels is influenced by consumer groups. Finally, due to the mixed consumption behaviour of customers, customer loyalty to the channel decreases, and the dynamic of price strategy strengthens. In fact, there are many other factors, such as channel cost, compensation, and coordination, which affect the pricing and selection of channels. For example, Amrouche and Yan [5] find that the distribution of profit is the key factor to coordinate the channel. Zhang and Wang [6] considered the effect of price sensitivity coefficient and competition coefficient on optimal pricing and coordination of different decision models in dual-channel supply.
The research on dual-channel pricing strategy mainly focuses on how manufacturers and retailers price in dual-channel to achieve equilibrium and maximize revenue. In the research methods and models, the objective function is constructed by the least cost and the maximum profit and analyzed by game theory and optimization method. Demand can be divided into two types: deterministic and stochastic demand. The influencing factors of demand include price, customer behaviour and so on. Chen et al. [7] employed two channelsâĂ"adding Pareto zones to characterize the effect of a new channel added. At the same time, they modelled price and quality decisions in the context of dual-channel supply chains and analyzed the impacts of channel structure on price, product quality, supply-chain members' profits, and consumer surplus. Wang et al. [8] investigated the pricing and service decisions of complementary products in a dual-channel supply chain. By using the backward induction and game theory, the corresponding analytical equilibrium solutions were obtained. Modak and Kelle [9] examined dual-channel supply chain under price and delivery-time dependent stochastic customer demand. They developed mathematical models with the profit maximization motive, and analyzed both centralized and decentralized systems for the unknown distribution function of the random variables through a distribution-free approach and also for known distribution function. They examined the effect of delivery lead time and customers channel preference on the optimal operation. Moreover, they used the generalized asymmetric Nash bargaining for surplus profit distribution.
There is another category of products which is known as perishable products. They must be consumed over a finite time horizon because the salvage values of the perishable products are very low or even lost after the finite time horizon. Examples include seats for the scheduled flight, rooms for the restaurant, or electricity and so on. Revenue management is an efficient tool in managing perishable products and e-commerce settings. For example, Cooper and Menich [10] first proposed the Vickery-Clark-Groves (VCG) Mechanism for the online ticket auction, but the auction method failed to reflect the dynamic nature of the sales process. Caldentey and Vulcano [11] analyzed the single auction model and the dual-channel model of the auction and marked price sales to sell multiple products of the same quality and proposed a progressive method to solve two optimal auction models. However, in the single auction model, they assumed the product supply is unlimited, and the auction losers can still purchase products at the list price if they failed in the auction. Besides, in the dual-channel model, they assumed only when there are unsold products at T will the auction occur. These assumptions may be inconsistent with the practical situation. In reality, the product supply of sellers is always limited, so customers who choose to participate in bidding and fail to obtain the product may also lose a chance to get the service at the list price due to limited supply.
In addition, the service seller always simultaneously operates dual-channels, which can be more complex. Meissner and Strauss [12] developed an approximate dynamic programming approach to network revenue management models with customer choice that approximates the value function of the Markov decision process with a non-linear function which is separable across resource inventory levels, and they proved that this approximation can exhibit significantly improved accuracy compared to currently available methods. Etzion and Moore [13] proposed two heuristics where consumers can choose whether to bid or buy in two channels including posted price and open-bid auctions, but their analytical model of consumers behavior cannot be solved for the optimal or equilibrium bidding strategies. Hosseinalifam et al. [14] developed a column generation algorithm to solve the customer choice-based mathematical program to estimate time-dependent bid prices, in which the mode is characterized by its flexibility. Pimentel et al. [15] compared the revenue-generating capabilities of the bid price allocation method and the nested network method in hotel revenue management. They executed simultaneous bid price with continuous re-optimization (SIMBPCON) method on an expansion of simulation parameter set to a real word-sized problem.
This paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. It proposes an equilibrium management model for the simultaneous operation of dual-channel sales and limits the supply of service products. First, the customers equilibrium participation strategy is modelled by a threshold function based on the customers private value about the product. Different from the indexed function used in existing literature, a power VOLUME 7, 2019 exponent utility function is used to model the discounted utility function about delaying obtaining the product. Based on the analysis of customers choice, in order to help sellers maximize the expected total revenue from two sales channels, an equilibrium management model is proposed to operate dual channels by calculating the optimal auction period, auction amount and the best list price. Finally, an airline example is shown as an example and validates the proposed model.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the problem as a basic model and provide some basic assumptions. In Section III, a dual-channel equilibrium management model including the auction price analysis, customer's participation strategy, and seller's management model are illustrated. In Section IV, we analyze the characteristics of our proposed model. While in Section V, an example of airline's selling tickets is used to validate the proposed model. Finally, in SectionVI, a conclusion and some future works are given.
II. BASIC MODEL DESCRIPTION
Along with the development of e-commerce, customers' shopping behaviours have been greatly changed. One does not have to go outside to buy a product. In order to meet new customer demands, an increasing number of service sales enterprises have started selling products through online auction. Thus, the seller sells servicing products simultaneously through two sales channels, namely list price sales and single-period auction.
From the perspective of revenue management, it is assumed that a seller's products are limited and that the remaining products after the sales period do not have any value. We study the problem faced by a seller offering Q units of a homogeneous product through an online auction with reservation price v R , during a fixed planning period of length T , and the posted price in the list price sales channel isP. This paper is aiming to help the seller decide these parameters to maximize his total expected revenue from both sales channels. First, we model the auction as a sealed-bid multi-unit second-price(also referred to as (q + 1)-price) auction. The winner is the bidder whose offer is the highest among all the bidders at q th auction and also higher than the reservation price v R . He will be charged at a price that is the highest offer at the (q + 1) th auction and also higher than v R . Second, we assume the arrival of customers obeys the Poisson's process whose parameter is λ. Every customer needs one product at most. It is assumed that customers are risk neutral and assess the product independently. The assessed price v of every customer is in line with independent identically (IID) distributed random variables. Its probability distribution function is F (v), which is a differentiable homogeneous function on [0, v M ] and density function is f (v). It is assumed that v M = 1, and F (v) is independent from customers' time of arrival. Since the two sales channels are simultaneously provided, it is assumed that customers can observe and compare these two sales channels while browsing the website without paying extra fees. Therefore, customers are fully prepared. They can observe the product's posted price, whether an auction is in progress, the number of products for auction and the remaining time of an auction, but the number of bid participants is unknown to them.
Third, in order to maximize their expected utility, customers must decide whether to participate in bidding and wait for the final auction results at time T or to immediately purchase products at the marked priceP. It is assumed that customers are sensitive to delay. We denote by u (t, τ, v, p) the discounted utility perceived by a buyer arriving at time t who eventually gets a unit of product at time τ at a price p with valuation v. Generally, the higher the assessed price v is, the more reluctant he is to wait. Therefore, we use (1 + v) −(τ −t) to represent invalid waiting of a customer, and the customer's utility function can be defined as
τ = ∞ is used to show that a buyer never gets the product, as a result, the value of discount utility function u will be zero. In addition, it is assumed that the number of products sold through the list price channel is limited. Thus, at the T instant when the auction ends, the products might have been sold out. This means the bidding losers might fail to purchase the product at the end of the auction. α t stands for the probability of a customer to purchase the product at the t instant on the list price market. In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that α t is a constant, which is the same at α.
From the perspective of customers, a customer arriving at time t ∈ [0, T ), based on his private utility function u, his knowledge about the probability of obtaining the products α, the arrival rate λ of customers, his private value of product v and the value distribution function F(v), the initial capacity Q offered for auction, the auction remaining time T − t, the reservation value v R and the posted priceP, choose either to bid or to buy at the fixed price channel in order to maximize his expected utility. This participation strategy can be characterized by a threshold function H (v) such that a buyer with valuation v enters the auction only if his arrival time exceeds H (v). Pictorially, H (v) divides buyer's type space (valuation, arrival time) into two regions, as shown in Fig. 1 , one corresponding to the posted-price buyers and the other associated to the auction bidders.
In the model, only when a customer's assessed price is v ≥ v R will it be related to the following analysis. It is assumed that v R is zero. Then, the bidder's assessment v, the probability distribution F(v), the arrival rate λ and the marked priceP are adjusted as
704 VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 1. Illustrations of the participation strategy H(v ). Point a and b stand for two customers with the same price assessment. According to their time of arrival, one participates in the auction while the other purchases products at the marked price.
The above conversion has two objectives. First, the model just considers customers whose assessed price is higher than or equal to the reserve price because the remaining customers have no substantial influence on auction results. Second, the value scope of the value function of these customers after model conversion is still [0, 1]. The two objectives are applicable to the marked priceP, the distribution function, F (v), and the arrival rate λ. In terms of service sellers, the customer's joining strategy is the basis for the maximization of their total expected revenue, which is related to the auction quantity, the auction time limit, and the marked price.
III. DUAL-CHANNEL EQUILIBRIUM MANAGEMENT MODEL
In this section, we build an equilibrium management model to analyze the issue faced by sellers. In the following, we focus on solving the following issues: 1) how customers choose when faced with two sales channels; 2) under the fixed consumption behaviour mode, how sellers choose the optimal auction parameters, including the auction period T , auction quantity Q and timing of the list price sales; and 3) the setting of optimal marked priceP to realize maximal total revenue of the two channels.
In subsection III-A, a threshold function based on customer's utility function is used to model consumer's choice between two channels, then the probability distribution of auction price is given. Subsection III-B analyses customers' possible equilibrium participation strategy when choosing the purchasing way of service products. Based on the customers' strategy, in subsection III-C, the optimization selection model is proposed as a decision support for the service seller.
A. AUCTION PRICE ANALYSIS
When a risk-neutral customer chooses the marked price channel, the customer has a large earning expectation. If a customer chooses the auction channel, he thinks there is such an opportunity for him to buy a product at a discount price lower than the list price. Of course, auction means cost, so customers always hope the discount on the auction price can be at least higher than the actual cost. There are two kinds of auction costs, namely the cost of participating in competitive bidding and the cost of delaying product purchase to the end of the auction. In this work, only the delaying cost is considered. By extending conclusions of [16, Lemma 1] , the optimal bidding strategy for a customer whose assessed price is v and has decided to participate in the auction can be obtained from
In other words, if a buyer with valuation v decides to enter the auction then he will bid b (v). For a low-valuation buyer with v <P, then b(v) = v, so participating in the auction is the only profitable channel he can choose. While for a high-valuation buyer with v ≥P, the posted price channel is also an alternative to consider.
As mentioned before, we characterize the decision of a buyer arriving at time t with private valuation v by a threshold function
such that the buyer will place a bid if and only if t ≥ H (v).
In order to keep our formulation reasonably simple, we assume that H (v) ∈ D, which is the set of piecewise continuous functions with left and right limits. We will see that this apparently restrictive assumption is not fully needed for almost all the strategies. Furthermore, for any v ∈ [0,P), we have H (v) = 0. This reflects the fact that any buyer with a valuation in this range cannot afford to buy the product in the external market. The auction is his only potentially profitable channel, no matter his arrival time. We will denote by the set of participation thresholds from which buyers choose their strategies.
In order to further study the customer participation strategy in the dual-channel revenue management model, particularly for those whose assessed price is in the range of (P, 1], an important random variable, the auction price p H (v), is defined. The auction price p H (v) is given from following prerequisites: 1) there is a buyer whose current valuation is v and has chosen to participate in the auction, and 2) all other buyers use the participation strategy H ∈ . During the time period of [0, T ], the function H (x) represents the average number of bidders with valuation in [x, 1]. Apart from current customers, all the remaining customers follow the strategy of H ∈ . The assessed price is x ∈ [0, 1]. It is defined that η H (x) is the average quantity of customers finally choosing the auction channel within the assessed price scope of [x, 1] . As the arrival of the customer obeys the Poisson's process, H (x) and η H (x) can be obtained as showed in (5) .
Assume that a single customer cannot influence the arrival rate of other customers. Use B ( H (x)) stand for the random number of bidders, whose valuation is greater than or equal to x. Since the arrival of buyers follows Poisson's process with rate λ, thus, B ( H (x)) also obeys a Poisson's process with mean H (x). Under a (q + 1)-price auction, given the equilibrium participation strategy H , we can now compute the probability distribution of p H (v) as
where I (x) is the indicator function of event x. As shown, p H (v) < x if and only if when x >P, or the number of bidders whose valuation v is greater than or equal to x is less than or equal to the number of products for auction, after getting subtracted by I (x ≤ v)). Obviously, P {p H (v) < x} is continuous on x.
B. SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM PARTICIPATION STRATEGY OF CUSTOMERS
In this part, customers' symmetric equilibrium participation strategy, H (v) will be analysed. Assume that all customers adopt the same strategy. Then, we can prove that there exists a symmetric balance. In the symmetric balance, customers whose assessed price of products is high enough can choose between two sales channels using the threshold value. Suppose a buyer arrives at time t with private valuation v ≥P and that every other buyer is using the participation strategy H ∈ . The probability of buying the product through the posted price channel is α. Thus, a rational buyer enters the auction if and only if
where u t, t, v,P is customer's expected utility who decides to purchase products through the fixed price channel instead of the auction one; u t, T , v,P is the expected utility of a customer participating in the auction but failing to buy the products and u (t, T , v, p H (v)) is the expected utility of a customer participating in the auction and succeeding in buying the products. Assume that other customers use the strategy H ∈ . Then, Proposition 1 can obtain the optimal response and participation strategy (H ) (v), after embedding the threshold value function in (7).
Proposition 1:
In terms of the utility function (1), (7) is equivalent to
Thus, a buyer arriving at time t with valuation v enters the auction if and only if t ≥ (H ) (v), where:
can efficiently build a mapping from to Xi. Conclusions of Proposition 2 show that the best-response strategies are K-Lipschitz continuous functions in [0, 1] . This property becomes relevant in our proof of the existence of an equilibrium strategy, and that a buyer whose private valuation price is slightly higher than the fixed price will participate in the auction no matter when he arrives.
Proposition 2: In terms of utility function (1), for any H ∈ , 1) There exists a private valuation price v H ∈ P , 1 ,
The following part proves that there exists a symmetric equilibrium strategy for a customer with a high private valuation of the product by implementing the equilibrium condition, (H * ) = H * . For the convenience of discussion, and can be redefined as
In (10), H is a K-Lipschitz continuous function on v ∈ [v, 1] and is the mapping from to : for ∀H ∈ ,
+ . Theorem 1: Assume the set of strategies equipped with the uniform norm H = sup |H (v)|, obeys the uniform distribution. Then, there exists a fixed point H * , on the mapping from to , which meets the condition of (H * ) = H * . Similarly, there exists a symmetric equilibrium participation strategy, when the following conditions in (11) are satisfied, the fixed point is unique.
According to Theorem 1, a deterministic function H * can be found on the set of defined by (11) . can be redefined as
while when v ∈ (v, 1], H is a K-Lipschitz continuous function. And can be redefined as
Then the symmetric equilibrium participation strategy of all customers H * : [0, 1] → [0, T ] can be obtained. In Proposition 3, the monotonicity of the symmetric equilibrium participation strategy H * is summarized.
Proposition 3: In terms of utility function (1), an equilibrium participation strategy, H * (v), is an increasing and concave function of v ∈ [v H , 1]. The monotonicity of H * (v) implies that buyers with large private valuation are less likely to participate in the auction. This is in line with the practical situation.
C. OPTIMIZATION SELECTION MODEL FOR THE SERVICE SELLER
Based on the customer's symmetric equilibrium participation strategy H * , the seller needs to decide the auction quantity Q, the auction time T and the marked priceP, so as to maximize its overall expected revenue.
Define N (t) as the total number of customers arriving at the t instant. According to the previous assumption, N (t) is the homogeneous Poisson's process with the arrival rate being λ. Set N a (t) to be the total number of customers participating in the auction until the t instant. Then N a (t) is the non-homogeneous Poisson's process with the arrival rate being λ H * (t); λ H * (t) can be expressed as below based on
where λ H * (t) stands for the equilibrium tendering and bidding rate at the t instant. According to Proposition 3, the properties of λ H * (t) can be easily inferred. Inference 1: If F (v) obeys uniform distribution or index distribution, then λ H * (t) is a progressive increase function within the section of t ∈ 0, H * (1) . It maintains at a constant value after it reaches the maximum value λ.
The online auction with a strict deadline should be equipped with the characteristic of λ H * (t). v 1 , v 2 , · · · , v N a (t) stands for the value sequence of bidders. The k th bidder's private valuation v k is replaced by v R . v (1) 
is the corresponding reversed order statistics. Assume that the private valuation of the bidder is generally larger than the reservation price v R . Based on the bidding strategy (3), it can be seen that, if the total number of bidders is N a (T ) = k, the expected offer of the i th high price bidder
V a (Q, T ) is the expected revenue that the service seller obtains from the auction channel. If the auction quantity Q and the auction deadline T are fixed, and the total number of customers N a (t), the k th bidder's private valuation v R , the total number of bidders k were known, the cost of the service seller to obtain the future revenue is ignored, V a (Q, T ) can be expressed as below:
If the service seller just wants to maximize the auction revenue, and the fixed price is set asP, then the seller just needs to solve the following random optimization issue:
where the total number of products owned by the seller is Q M . When the service production and the service enterprise adopt the dual-channel management, the following optimization problem should be solved so as to achieve the optimal marked priceP, the auction quantity Q, and the auction deadline T :
It is complex to solve the model, so the approximation method is used for simplification. During the approximation analysis, an extreme situation is considered in which the average arrival rate of customers λ grow proportionally large. All other parameters are kept independent of n. The auction price for instance n given that v-buyer(personal valuation is v) enters the auction is p n H (v), and the auction quantity is Q n T . We define the asymptotic condition as:
Therefore, the probability distribution of the auction price can be expressed as below:
where ρ = Q/λT and the auction price p ∞ H (v) is free from the influence of the bidder's decision. Thus, according to the approximation method, it is simplified as below:
1) The auction price p H * is the unique solution in [0,P] to the equation
where
2)The auction price equals to the reservation price, that is p H * = 0, only if
where v H * = min{P
3) All arriving buyers enter the auction, that is H * (v) = 0, for all v ∈ [0, 1], only if
and
IV. MODEL CHARACTERISTICS ANALYSIS
Theoretically, the model is similar to the traditional single-period and private valuation auction model in many aspects, but it also has its own characteristics by considering sales channels. With the existence of the dual channels, the customer can purchase products and obtains the positive utility not only through the auction but also from fixed price channel. It is necessary to study the behavioural modes of customer groups and build the customer selection mode under the dual channels. This significant difference from the previous auction model research findings makes the model research in this paper more challenging and practical. From the perspective of practices, the model focuses on the game between customers and the game between customers and sales enterprises of service products during the transaction process. It also considers the customer's strategic behaviours and captures the characteristics of the game theory. This can promote production and enterprises to reasonably divide markets and achieve supplementation of two sales channels.
V. CALCULATION EXAMPLE
In order to illustrate the proposed model, in this section, an airline is taken as an example. It is assumed that an airline sells tickets of one of its flights through auction and list price; the auction quantity is Q; the auction deadline is T ; the marked price isP; the number of tickets for a specific flight is limited, and might have been sold out at the T instant after the end of the auction, which means the loser in the auction might lose chance to get a ticket. α stands for the probability of buying an air ticket at the t instant on the list price sales market. The arrival of customers obeys the Poisson's process with the parameter λ. Every customer can buy one ticket at most. The private valuation price of buyers obeys the IID random variable, and its probability distribution function is F (v). Customers can observe the list price of tickets, whether an auction is held, the remaining number of tickets in the auction and the auction deadline. Then, they can decide whether to participate in the bidding and wait for auction results at the T instant or to immediately purchase the ticket at the fixed priceP based on their utility function. As to model calculation, the iterative algorithm can be applied to prove the convergence of the model under some conditions. However, the calculation is much too complex. In order to simplify the calculation, the asymptotic analysis method proposed in [11] is adopted to solve the model. In particular, we consider the limiting case in which both the number of tickets for auction Q and the average arrival rate λ grow proportionally large. In this way, we show that characterizing the bidders' strategy H (v) is equivalent to solving a deterministic problem. Besides, reference [11] have proved robust of the method. Let ρ = Q/λT stand for the oversupply ratio. When ρ < 1, it means the ticket supply is more than the number of customers or, in other words, demand exceeds supply. On the contrary, the supply exceeds the demand.
(1)Assume that the airline begins selling tickets through auction at t = 0. At T = 1, it stops the auction sales. After the end of the auction, customers can purchase tickets through the posted price sale channel that is in progress. Suppose ρ < 1, that is, the number of tickets is in short supply. Since the number of tickets for specific flight is limited, these tickets might have been sold out at the end of the auction. 
then the auction price P * H = 0, and the corresponding participation strategy
, then H * = 0, and P H * = (1 − ρ) + .
3) IfP 1 <P <P 2 , then the auction price P H * ∈ (0,P). These show that,P 1 is the lower bound on the posted price and over which there will have customers to participate in the auction. If the posted price exceedsP 2 , all customers will enter the auction channel. In this case, the ticket excess rate ρ is set to be 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8, respectively. Fig. 2 plots the auction price as a function of the posted price. It can be seen that, when the posted priceP of the ticket for the flight is relatively low, the auction price of the ticket is 0. For example, when ρ = 0.4 andP 1 = 0.1. In other words, a relatively low posted price will drive a large number of customers to purchase air tickets at a fixed price instead of participating in the auction. It is easy to discover that with the increase of ρ, P 1 also increases. It reflects the fact that the higher the number of product units for auction, the lower the value of the final winning bid.P 2 refers to the minimum auction price that all customers participate in the auction. For example, in Fig. 2 , when ρ = 0.4,P 2 = 0.6. We can see thatP 2 decreases with the increase of ρ. That is to say, the higher the ρ, the lower the posted price needed to induce all the players to participate in the auction.
(2)After having characterized the strategic behaviour of the customers, in this section, we analyze the sellers design of the auction channel with the objective of maximizing revenues. We will work on the simple asymptotic regime, assuming that the original distribution of valuation is F = U [0, 1]. We also use (2) is section II to formula the sellers problem in terms of the original data. This problem consists on finding a reservation price v R , a posted priceP, and possibly an auction duration T , that maximize the sellers revenue, which we assume is exponentially discounted over time at rate α. Note that the seller can restrict the optimization to those cases in which v R ≤P, otherwise the auction is trivially dominated by the fixed-price channel.
Similar to the above case, it is assumed that the airline starts selling tickets through the auction channel at t = 0. At T = 1, sales of the auction channel stop. If the seller chooses a posted-priceP such that ρ ≤ 1 −P then independently of reservation price v R the auction never takes place; all units are sold through the fixed-price channel, all units are sold through the fixed-price channel. The sellers revenue function in this dual-channel case is given by
where τ * = Q 0 λ(1−P)
, which leads to the following constrained optimization:
The parameters considered are: T = ω = 1, α = 2, and λ = 10. Fig. 3 shows the expected sellers revenue as a function of the listed priceP. Fig. 3(a) illustrates this for Q 0 = 4, and Fig. 3(b) illustrates this for Q 0 = 10. Given that the reservation price of the auction has been optimized for everyP, the list price to post must be marginally above 0.6. For prices below, there is no auction, and determines the revenues. For prices above, there are some remaining units at T , and the auction takes place. Moreover, in case (a), forP > 0.84, no customers go to the posted price channel. In case (b), the optimal list price to post isP = 0.5, for list prices in range [0, 0.92], there is no auction; and for list prices above 0.92, nobody goes for the list price.
(3)We consider here the case of a monopolistic seller who has Q 0 units to sell through two different channels: a list price channel, in which she sets a constant list priceP that, will be kept during the whole horizon of length T , and the auction that will take place at the end, with the remaining Q T units. Therefore, in this new setting the optimal bidding strategy for bidders is b(v) = v as opposed to the strategy b(v) = min{P, v} in previous section. To see this, note that in this case a high-valuation buyer, for example with v >P, that enters the auction and loses will not get the object at all, since all the units are cleared at T among buyers with valuations above. Therefore, once this high-valuation buyer decides to enter the auction then the game he plays is exactly equivalent to a (Q T + 1)-price auction for which we know the optimal strategy is to bid the true valuation, b(v) = v.
Similar to the previous section, we analyze the buyers participation problem under the scaling in (2), we study the sellers optimization problem with (14) . The parameters considered are: the airline has already confirmed the ticket quantity Q 0 = 20, original valuations with distribution F = U [0, 1], the arrival of customers obeys the Poissons process with the parameter being λ = 10, the invalid waiting rate of VOLUME 7, 2019 customers is ω = 1, the probability for customer to succeed in buying a ticket on the marked price market at the t instant is α = 0.8. The list price is set to beP = 0.6, while V R = 0 is not set. The optimization problem max T ≥0 V (Q, T ) is solved so as to seek the optimal auction deadline T , and the optimal reserve price v R . As is shown in Fig. 4 , when T = 0.4 and v R = 0.6, the airlines revenue function is maximum and the revenue function is unimodal in this case. There is a range of reservation prices (starting at v R = 0) such that all the Q 0 units are allocated to the winners. However, for a higher v R , the number of bidders is less than Q 0 , and revenues start to decrease.
VI. CONCLUSION
Along with the development of e-commerce, online auction has become increasingly popular. This paper builds the dual-channel equilibrium management model for service products in which the service seller simultaneously manages a dual auction and list price channel. The key to building this model is understanding the strategic behaviour of the bidders, provided they choose to either join the auction or buy the product at the posted price. Under the prerequisite that the service seller has a limited stock, this paper proposes an equilibrium participation strategy for buyers who choose the purchasing channel based on the threshold value function. It is proved that there is only one symmetric equilibrium participation strategy for bidders and it is monotonous towards customers' private value changes. Based on customers' equilibrium strategy, from the seller's perspective, the optimal selection model for auction quantity, deadline, and the posted price is built under the dual-channel mode. Finally, the asymptotic analysis method is used to simplify the model, and the numerical calculation examples are used to verify the model effectiveness. This model allows the service production and enterprises to make the two channels to supplement each other through reasonable market segmentation. This can alleviate the mutual counteraction behaviours between the two channels.
The proposed model of this work can contribute to dual-channel management decision-making, but this research is preliminary and limited. We will explore the following future work: 1) finding out the corresponding symmetric equilibrium strategy when the probability of products being sold out through the marked price channel at the T instant is improved; 2)working out the changes that will happen to the customer's symmetric equilibrium strategy and the seller's optimal selection model when the reserve price has been changed into a decision-making variable and 3) applying the single-period online auction model to the multi-period online auction period.
APPENDIX
Below is the demonstration process of the three propositions in this paper, which can help readers better understand the model.
A. DEMONSTRATION PROCESS OF PROPOSITION 1
First, the following equation can be easily proved:
Combining (7),
Simply the left side of the inequation, and take the logarithm of the two sides to obtain the following participation constraint:
Then, Equation (8) is proved. The inequation suggests that the assessed value, v >P, and to purchase at the t instant form the optimal response strategy. However, it is impossible to guarantee K (v, H ) is nonnegative. Thus, Equation (8) is used to define the optimal response strategy.
In order to prove the continuity of (H ) (v), (H ) (v) is obviously continuous when v ∈ 0,P . P p H (v) <P is independent from v. Since P {p H (v) < x} is segmented within x ∈ 0,P and its right side is continuous, thus (H ) (v) is also continuous within v ∈ P , 1 .
Besides, as to v ↓P, there is (H ) (v) → 0. When v >P and x ∈ 0,P ,
Therefore, as if H ∈ , there is:
According to (9) , there is (H ) (v) → 0 = (H ) P . Thus, if H ∈ , the optimal response strategy, (H ) (v), is actually continuous within v ∈ [0, 1].
B. DEMONSTRATION PROCESS OF PROPOSITION 2 1) Prove there exists a v H , which satisfy the following condition: 
2)Define that p 0 (v) is the auction price when H (v) ≡ 0. If H ∈ , v ∈ P , 1 , there is:
Where, if v <P,
Besides, P p H (v) <P is independent from v. If v 0 is the solution of the follow equation, Since v >P, P 0 P {p H (v) < x} dx is independent from v. Based on the definition of H (v), the following equations can be easily obtained:
The following conclusion can be reached:
Sincev >P, the constant K is limited. This proves that, within the scope of v ∈ [v, 1], (H ) (v) is a K-Lipschitz continuous function.
C. DEMONSTRATION PROCESS OF THEOREM 1
Similar to the demonstration process of [11, Th. 1] , is a compact convex set. If the optimal response set, , is continuous on , has a fixed point, H * , which is continuous, according to the Schauder's fixed point theorem in Chapter Seven of the research carried out by Cheney [16] . Therefore, it is necessary to prove that is continuous. According to Eqs. (5) and (6), and its nature of Poisson's distribution, 
